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On 30 September, the European Commission has finally presented its long-awaited
first edition of the new Annual Rule of Law Report, assessing the situation of the rule
of law in all member states. In cases like Hungary and Poland, where the rule of law
and democracy have been deliberately dismantled over the years, this monitoring
approach, however, will hardly help. The report is unfortunately too little, too late.
Instead, the EU needs to strengthen its enforcement capacity by linking breaches of
the rule of law with actual sanctions.
The first Annual Rule of Law Report
The new Rule of Law Report is just one in the European Union’s rule of law toolbox
that has been gradually supplemented with new instruments, mainly because of
serious backsliding tendencies in Hungary and Poland. In its 2019 communication
Strengthening the rule of law within the Union – A blueprint for action the European
Commission laid out a comprehensive plan to safeguard rule of law (and democracy)
in the EU member states and thus uphold the values of Article 2 TEU on which the
EU is founded. Apart from its idea to promote a rule of law culture, it also announced
to establish an Annual Rule of Law Review Cycle that would culminate in the
publication of an Annual Rule of Law Report. In her programme A Union that strives
for more new Commission President Ursula von der Leyen outlined this new review
cycle including the report under the heading of a new “Rule of Law Mechanism”.
On 30 September 2020 the Commission finally published its long-awaited first
edition of the Annual Report, which is divided into a summary report covering overall
developments in all 27 member states and specific country reports. The assessment
is not limited to rule of law issues in the narrow sense, but also covers aspects that
have a direct bearing on the rule of law, namely media pluralism, anti-corruption
framework and institutional checks-and-balances. Moreover, it explicitly covers both
negative and positive rule of law developments, highlighting both challenging and
reassuring reforms in the member states (the overall tone is in fact rather positive,
with a strong emphasis on positive developments, so as to encourage member
states).
The documents are worth reading for all those interested in the rule of law in the
European Union. The summary report demonstrates that rule of law challenges
are not restricted to only a few states, and that these can be found in both “old”
Western and “new” Eastern democracies, albeit to varying degrees. It also finds
that in general, member states make serious attempts at improving for example the
effectiveness of their judicial systems or their anti-corruption strategies.
- 1 -
Prevention but no sanctions
Expectations on the new Rule of Law Report have been especially high with regard
to cases like Hungary and Poland. Previous attempts to discipline their governments
through existing procedures like the Rule of Law Framework (Poland) or the Article
7 (1) TEU procedure (both) have not resulted in any significant change (just read
the many comments and analyses on the EU’s attempts to safeguard the rule of
law published on Verfassungsblog over the last few years, for example here and
here). Therefore, Commission Vice-President V#ra Jourová argued in a recent
interview with the German news magazine Der Spiegel (which by the way sparked
massive protests, leading to the Hungarian government’s demand that Jourová
resign) that the comparative assessment of all EU member states would be helpful in
the conflicts with Poland and Hungary by refuting accusations of double standards.
But is the Commission’s new Annual Rule of Law Report really the solution to cases
like Hungary and Poland? The answer is unfortunately no, and there are two major
reasons for this.
First, it is a preventive instrument that “will assist early detection of emerging rule
of law problems wherever they appear” by “provid[ing] a synthesis of significant
developments in the Member States and at EU level”. As such, “it could highlight
best practices and identify recurrent problems” (ibid.).
Identifying problems might be useful and might work in cases where illiberal
tendencies or anti-democratic reforms are only beginning to unfold, like in Bulgaria or
the Czech Republic.
The identification of problems and systemic deficiencies does not, however,
make a difference in entrenched authoritarian regimes like Hungary and Poland
anymore. Their governments have deliberately dismantled democracy and rule
of law institutions, and have all along resisted the EU institutions’ demands for
change. Why should the report lead to a modification of their positions and policies?
It is much more likely that they will simply reject the report’s findings and continue
questioning the Commission’s objectivity on rule of law issues. In fact, Hungarian
Minister of Justice Judit Varga has already claimed that the report’s contents were
unfounded because many of the organizations that served as sources were financed
by George Soros. Poland’s and Hungary’s joint announcement to establish their own
rule of law institute in Brussels to ensure that they are not treated unfairly and remain
victims to Brussels’ double standards is also a clear sign of this.
Moreover, rule of law problems and democratic deficits have already been
sufficiently identified and documented by the Commission itself (think about the four
Rule of Law Recommendations issued within the Rule of Law Framework on Poland)
as well as other EU institutions, first and foremost the European Parliament. To
mention just a few, the European Parliament’s so called Tavares Report adopted in
2013 and its Sargentini Report from 2018 already demonstrated that the Hungarian
democracy and rule of law suffer from several shortcomings. Similarly, just two
weeks ago the Parliament adopted its most recent resolution “on the proposal for
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a Council decision on the determination of a clear risk of a serious breach by the
Republic of Poland of the rule of law”, in which it neatly summarized the major
shortcomings of Polish democracy and the rule of law. Therefore, when the report
for example identifies a weakening of judicial independence, a lack of independence
and effectiveness of the institutions overseeing the public media or pressure on civil
society, it does not tell us anything new about the state of the rule of law in those two
countries.
According to the Commission, the report’s findings should now serve as starting
point for inter-institutional dialogues on the rule of law between Parliament and
Council. Discussing new and troubling developments in democratic contexts seems
reasonable and important. In cases like Hungary and Poland, however, it seems too
late for such discussions, especially against the background of repeated discussions
in the past, for example in the Parliament’s plenary debates. Just talking about
troubling developments without acting is not enough anymore.
And this leads to the second reason, namely that there are no sanctions attached.
The Commission announced back in 2019 that it would “make full use of its
enforcement powers, if early detection and prevention measures are not effective”.
However, negative findings in the report do not automatically lead to sanctions. The
EU institutions could consider activating other instruments such as rule of law-related
infringement procedures or the Article 7 (2) TEU procedure, but they are not obliged
to do so. Instead of hard sanctions, the report can only rely on naming and shaming
or social pressure. However, the deployment of other soft instruments relying solely
on social pressure and dialogue, like the Rule of Law Framework in case of Poland,
did not lead to a termination or reversal of illiberal policies in the past either. Why
then should we expect that it will be different after the publication of the Annual Rule
of Law Report? Without sanctions, the report is just another rule of law instrument
lacking enforcement capacity.
A useful instrument in cases of serious rule of law
backsliding?
In brief, the Annual Rule of Law Report might be a useful instrument to provide
policy-makers and the public with a comprehensive picture of the rule of law situation
in the EU member states. As such, it could indeed become an early warning system
for the European Union institutions by pointing out national deficiencies which would
otherwise remain hidden. Also, it could serve as a catalyst for reforms in member
states governed by reform-minded and EU-friendly governments. As V#ra Jourová
said: “[I]t fills an important gap, because we were missing a tool that would allow to
identify problems at the early stage … we already have infringement procedures, we
have the Article 7 process, for instance, but these are the tools that allow us to react
after it is often too late.”
Contrary to the high expectations placed on the report, the above mentioned reasons
cast doubt on the premise, however, that it will become a game changer in the
Union’s efforts to safeguard the rule of law on national level. Therefore, to finally
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install a financial conditionality mechanism would be a good starting point in this
respect.
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